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United States v. Carter, 1 M.J. 318 (C.M.A. 1976).
But see Army Reg. No. 600-20, Personnel-General
Army Command Policy and Procedure, para. 3-4 (28
April1971).
"'Mil. R. Evid. 315(d) (1).
""Current procedure only allows the Navy, Coast
Guard and Marine Corps to employ this methodology.
31

6 M.J. 307 (C.M.A. 1979). But see United States v.
Powell, 8 M.J. 260 (C.M.A. 1980).

""!d. at 319.
33

!d. But see United States v. Powell, 8 M.J. 260
(C.M.A. 1980).

.. United States v. Carter, 1 M.J. 318 (C.M.A. 1976).
35

Mil. R. Evid. 315(d)(2).

., See United States v. Reagan, 7 M.J. 490 (C.M.A.
1979) (no authority within N.A.T.O. Agreement to
permit search of accused's car). Cf. United States v.
Dillard, 8 M.J. 213 (C.M.A. 1980) (search conducted
in violation of army regulation results in exclusion).
'"403

& (2).

See Army Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services Military
Justice, para. 14-6 (November 1968).

.. Mil. R. Evid. 315(h) (1).
""Mil. R. Evid. 315(h) (2).

u.s. 443

(1971) .

.. See e.g., United States v. Thomas, 36 C.M.R. 462
.(C.M.A. 1966); United States v. Mossbauer, 44
C.M.R. 14 (C.M.A. 1971).
"See United States v. Liberti, 26 CrL 2441 (1980);
United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
'"Mil. R. Evid. 316(d)(4)(C) .
.. Mil. R. Evid. 316(b).
47

""Compare Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and
MCM, 1969, para. 152, with Mil. R. Evid. 315(f) (1)
37

•• Mil. R. Evid. 315(h) (3).

49 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979).

•• Quaere : What result would follow under the Military
Rules of Evidence if there was not a fourth amendment violation, but a 'due process' violation couched
in terms of the fifth amendment'?

•• But see, Army Reg. No. 190-53, Interception of Wire
and Oral Communications for Law Enforcement Purposes, para. 2-2a(9) (a) (1 November 1978) and
United States v. Dillard; 8 M.J. 213 (C.M.A. 1980).

Bodily Evidence and Rule 312, M.R.E.
CPT(P) David A. Schlueter
Instructor, Criminal Law Division
The Judge Advocate General's School
Introduction

CID is calling from the Post hospital. A drug
deal gone awry has left the seller in critical
condition with a bullet lodged in his back. The
two unidentified male caucasian buyers fled the
scene with a small packet of heroin. One probably received a bullet wound from the seller's
gun as he fled. Shortly afterwards an MP
patrol stopped a weaving car occupied by two
male Caucasians matching the description of
the "buyers". The driver appeared to be intoxicated, the passenger had a bullet wound in his
shoulder. The MP's effected a lawful apprehension, called the CID, and proceeded to the
hospital. CID wants to know what they must
do to get the two bullets, a· blood test on the

driver, and the heroin which is possibly secreted
in the passenger's rectum.
Although in its composite form the foregoing problem is not common, the individual
questions of lawful seizure and admissibility
of each piece of evidence do arise with great
frequency. The answers to the questions raised
should be examined in the light of three controlling principles which potentially apply in
any case involving bodily evidence:
(1) The right against self-incrimination;
(2) fourth amendment protections; and
(3) due process considerations.
This article addresses those principles and the
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impact of Rule 312, Bodily Views, and Intrusions, Military Rules of Evidence 1 on their
application. We turn first to the potential question, or principle, of the applicability of the
right against self-incrimination.
Self -incrimination Considerations
Does an individual have a right to refuse to
present bodily evidence on the rationale that it
will violate his right against self-incrimination?
The civilian courts, considering the fifth amendment protection, say, "no." The right only protects compelled testimonial communications.
The Supreme Court has for example rejected
self-incrimination arguments where blood was
taken from the suspect. 2 However, different
results may emerge in the military setting
where a service member gains the broad coverage of Article 31, U.C.M.J. Although a service
member may not stand behind the right against
self-incrimination when asked to provide external body evidence such as tatoos, scars, hair,
and teeth impressions, 3 he may properly invoke
the right when asked to provide bodily fluids
such as blood, semen, or urine. 4
If the sought evidence is a foreign object
located in the body, protection of Article 31
may be available depending on the manner of
obtaining it. An order to a suspect to extract
an object from a body cavity would probably
be protected under the verbal acts doctrineturning over the evidence wo1,1.ld constitute ~n
incriminating "statement". 5 Letting nature run
its course or removal by another would more
than likely avoid the issue of self-incrimination. 6 Although the law here is always in a
state of flux, it seems safe to conclude that
bodily fluids or other internal bodily evidence
voluntarily submitted by the suspect after
proper warnings and waiver would overcome
self-incrimination arguments/ If the evidence
was obtained under compulsion, then selfincrimination problems may also fade if the
individual suffers no criminal consequence. 8
The Military Rules of Evidence do not change
the military's broader application of the right
against self-incrimination. Provision is made,
however, in Rule 305 that right to counsel

warnings need be given only when testimonial
communications are sought. 9
Applying these general principles to the facts
presented in the introduction, do any of the
actors have a right to refuse to provide the
sought evidence on grounds of self-incrimination? Retrieving the bullets should not present
a self-incrimination problem. Although the
wounded seller and wounded passenger are
suspects and entitled to rights warnings before
being questioned, 10 compelling them to submit
to surgical removal, whether major or minor,
should not raise self-incrimination problems.
Different results occur, however, with regard
to the blood sample and the heroin. Simply
ordering the suspects to provide the evidence
clearly raises self-incrimination problems. The
CID may obtain the evidence either through
voluntary reli11quishment or through compulsion accompanied by immunity from use of the
incriminating evidence. 11
The second potential principle to be addressed
is application of fourth amendment guidelines.
Here, the Military Rules of Evidence do specifically make major changes and may ultimately resolve some of the potential selfincrimination problems arising in cases where
bodily evidence is in issue.
Fourth Amendment Considerations: Rule 312
Clearly, right to privacy considerations, the
core of the fourth amendment, are present in
cases where the government is searching or
seizing evidence from an inidvidual's person.
The civilian and military courts in addressing
the applicability of the fourth amendment generally apply a sliding scale analysis approach
to bodily evidence questions. The inquiry centers on the degree of intrusion. At one end of
the spectrum lie those cases involving only
visual examination of the body. 12 At the other
lie surgical intrusions for the purposes of
obtaining incriminating evidence. Implicit
throughout the analysis is a balancing of the
government's and individual's interests. 13
The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial provision on bodily evidence was included in the
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discussion on search and seizure and allowed
for intrusions under certain circumstances. 14
Rule 312 of the new rules of evidence specifically addresses the fourth amendment issues
and generally follows (as will the next section)
the sliding-scale tact employed by the courts.
Visual Examination of the Body: Rule 312(b)
Under Rule 312(b) visual examination of
the body may be conducted with the consent
of the individualY It may be conducted without
consent if done in a reasonable manner and
under one of several authorized procedures:
(I) Inspection or inventory ;16
(2) Border search or its military equivalent

if there is a real suspicion that weapons,
contraband or evidence of a crime are
concealed on the individual ;17
(3) Jail search ;18
( 4) Search incident to apprehension ;19
( 5) Emergency search ;20 or

(6) Probable cause search. 21

An authorized involuntary examination of
the body may include visual examination of
body cavities. The rule urges use of a member
of same sex as the individual when conducting
the examination but failure to do so does not
render any seized evidence inadmissible. 22 The
rule appears to follow what civilian law exists
on the subject. The greater amount of litigation has centered on what are typically characterized as "strip searches" at borders to the
United States 23 or pursuant to prison searches. 24
This rule, however, clearly links nonconsensual
bodily inspections or viewing with other valid
searches and thus places paramaters on what
has proved to be a delicate topic in some civilian
jurisdictions. So much for the superficial examination of the body human; actual intrusion
into a body cavity to retrieve the evidence is
covered in Rule 312(c).
Intrusion Into Body Cavities: Rule 312(c)
Rule 312 (c) separates body cavities into two
categories. The first category is comprised of

the "mouth, nose, and ears." The second includes "other body cavities." Reasonable nonconsensual physical intrusion into the first
category is allowed whenever a visual inspection
of the body is allowed. For example, to seize a
piece of evidence secreted in the individual's
mouth, the law enforcement officials must either
(1) obtain the individual's consent or (2) proceed under one of the listed authorized searches
in Rule 312(b)(2). 25
Different rules apply to intrusions into the
second category of body cavities. Although not
specifically addressed, consensual intrusions
apparently require no special consideration
other than the reasonableness of the intrusion. 26
Nonconsensual intrusions are further categorized into those involving "seizures" 27 and those
involving "searches." 28
A "search" for weapons, contraband, or evidence must be conducted by an individual with
"appropriate medical qualifications" 29 and
only after first obtaining authorization under
Rule 315 which details the requirements for
a probable cause search. 30 A "reasonable" nonconsensual "seizure" of contraband, evidence
or weapons spotted during a lawful visual inspection or pursuant to a "plain view" must be
conducted by a person with appropriate medical
qualifications. 31 For example, if law enforcement personnel discover seizable contraband
in an individual's rectum or vagina during a
properly conducted visual examination or pursuant to a plain view observation, they should
request the assistance of medical personnel to
actually extract the contraband. 32 If they have
not seen but have probable cause to believe
that the contraband is secreted in the rectum
or vagina they should proceed to obtain proper
authorization and then use medical personnel
to actually conduct the search. Note that the
rule provides that if the search is being conducted in a jail or similar facility, it may be
based on "real suspicion that weapons, contraband, or evidence are being concealed on the
individual," and may be conducted without
prior authorization. 33
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Seizing Bodi!y Fluids: Rule 312( d)
As in the rule's provision covering intrusion
into body cavities, no specific provision is made
in 312 (d) for consensual seizure of bodily fluids.
Arguably such a voluntary relinquishment of
fluids would be permiss.ible. 34 The rule does
specifically address nonconsensual seizures of
bodily fluids such as blood and urine.
If the seizure is nonconsensual, the authorities must obtain either a search warrant or a
search authorization. An exception to this requirement may exist if "there is a clear indication that evidence of crime will be found"
and delay resulting from obtaining the necessary authorization will result in its destruction.35 In any seizure of bodily fluids, the extraction must be reasonable and conducted by
medical personnel.

Absent from this provision is language addressing potential self-incrimination questions
associated with production of bodily fluids. 3 "
The intent of the drafters is apparently centered on treatment of the issue as primarily a
search and seizure problem. But as noted earlier, counsel must, in any bodily evidence fact
pattern, go through an analysis of potential
self-incrimination applications. Foresight might
avoid the Article 31 (a) self-incrimination problems. If the authorities treat the production of
the fluids as a. fourth amendment problem and
not simply issue "orders" or requests" to the
individual for the fluids, they will be in a better
position to argue the inapplicability of the
Article 31(a) line of cases touching on bodily
fluids. 37
Other Intrusive Searches: Rule 312(e)
If law enforcement officials wish to obtain
or locate items not in the scope o:f the provisions governing visual examination of the body
or intrusion into the body cavities, according
to 312(e) the intrusion must (1) be based upon
a search warrant or authorization; (2) be
conducted in a reasonable fashion by medical
personnel; and (3) not endanger the health of
the individual being searched. Compelling bodily elimination of the object or forcing ingestion

of tracer substances constitutes a search within
the rule. 3 8 Simply allowing nature to run fts
course would apparently not raise any serious
fourth amendment problems. 39 Note that these
intrusive searches may not be conducted upon
individuals not suspects or accuseds.
This portion of the rule should cover those
situations generally classified in the civilian line
of cases as surgical intrusions to obtain evidence. Those cases generally apply a balancing
test of all the interests involved; that is, the
government's need for the evidence, the individual's privacy and health, and the proposed
procedureS. 40

A judicial template in this area which may
be helpful is United States v. CrowderY Police,
anxious to retrieve two bullets (in wrist and
thigh) from a suspected murderer, sought assistance from a United States Attorney who
applied for and obtained judicial approval to
have the evidence surgically removed. The
application was unsuccessfully opposed by the
defendant who also unsuccessfully sought a
writ of prohibition. The bullets were surgically
removed and later offered into evidence. The
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia sustained the conviction; the court seemed to be
impressed with: (1) the fact that the only way
to get this relevant evidence was through surgical removal; (2) the defendant was offered
an opportunity to block the application for the
surgery; (3) he was offered an opportunity for
appellate review of the order to remove the
bullets ; and ( 4) the surgery was minor and
was conducted by skilled doctors who took all
of the necessary precautions.
Under Rule 312, judicial authorizations to
search for or seize bodily evidence are not
required. But inthe situation where surgical
intrusions are required, the Crowder procedures
serve as a good example of a "reasonable"
surgical intrusion.
Intrusions for Valid Medical Purposes: Rule
312(f)
Serving as a relief valve for any bodily
evidence issue, whether a mere visual examina-
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tion or a surgical intrusion, is the rule's provision which states:
Evidence or contraband obtained from
an examination or intrusion conducted
for a valid medical purpose may be
seized and is not evidence obtained
from an unlawful search or seizure.
"

42

Implicit in this is a requirement to examine
the actual purpose and method of the examination. Simply labelling a search or seizure as a
valid medical examination probably will not
be sufficient. What about taking blood or urine
samples for the medical purpose of detecting
drug usage? Again, there may not be a fourth
amendment problem but Article 31 (a) lingers
on and must be considered. 43
Turning briefly to the problem presented in
the introduction, may the CID properly seize
the two bullets, the blood sample, and the
heroin? Yes, on all three counts. Assuming that
the three suspects refuse to voluntarily provide
the evidence, the CID have several options but
the surest method is to proceed under Rule
312 and obtain a search authorization for each
item.H That assumes of course that probable
cause may be established for each requested
search; if it does not exist, for example, with
regard to the heroin, other provisions of Rule
312 might support a visual examination and
subsequent seizure under 312(b) 45 or 312(f). 46

the seizure and in some instances mandates
that medical personnel effect the seizure. The
rule certainly does not abrogate any due process
questions; a properly authorized intrusion may
nonetheless be prohibited on due process
grounds. For example, the authorities may have
proper authorization to seize drugs secreted in
a body cavity but in effecting the seizure "shock
the conscience" in the manner in which they
retrieve the contraband. 48
Conclusion
Rule 312 makes a bold step in the law of
bodily evidence. For the first time in military
practice, many of the bodily evidence rules are
now codified. Codification notwithstanding, the
important issues of self-incrimination and due
process remain open and must be considered in
conjunction with the fourth amendment issues
in Rule 312. Treating the bodily evidence problem as a fourth amendment issue from the
outset and using extreme care in executing the
searches or seizures will probably avoid both
the self-incrimination and due process issues.
Footnotes
'1980 Military Rules of Evidence revise Chapter 27
of the Manual for Courts-Martial. They are effective
on 1 September 1980 [hereinafter cited as Mil. R.
Evid.].
2

See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
The majority specifically rejected the argument that
a right to privacy existed in the 5th Amendment. See
generally Eckhardt, Intrusions Into the Body, 52
Mil. L. Rev. 141 (1971), for a very good discussion
of comparisons in civilian military practice. For a
further discussion on the civilian practice see 25
ALR2d 1407.

3

See e.g., United States v. Martin, ___ M.J. __ _
(N.C.M.R. 1979) (teeth impressions); United States
v. Cain, 5 M.J. 844 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (accused
ordered to exhibit teeth during trial); United States
v. Culver, 44 C.M.R. 564 (A.F.C.M.R. 1971) (teeth);
United States v. Johnson, 39 C.M.R. 745 (A.B.R.
1968) (hair sample); United States v. Pyburn, 47
C.M.R. 896 (A.F.C.M.R. 1973) (pubic hair sample).
In seizing these samples the authorities may use
reasonable force. See also United States v. Rosato, 3
C.M.A. 143, 11 C.M.R. 143 (1943) (accused or suspect
may be required to grow or trim a beard or try on a
garment or submit to fingerprinting, placing foot in
tracks or exhibiting scars).

Due Process Considerations
The third and final consideration in the area
of bodily evidence is the pervasive theme of
"due process". This is especially important in
bodily evidence questions where the individual's
right to be secure in his or her person is paramount. Courts are forever sensitive to the
Rochin "shock the conscience" test 47 and the
possibility that the invasion, however, slight!
might constitute an unwarranted violation of
one's dignity and privacy.
Rule 312 senses the delicate and personal
nature of bodily evidence questions and so requires "reasonable" execution of the search or
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• See e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. 181, 48
C.M.R. 797 (C.M.A. 1974) (order to urinate violated
suspect's Article 31(a) right not to give incriminating evidence); United States v. Musquire, 9 C.M.A.
67, 25 C.M.R. 329 (1958) (giving blood sample would
be "statement"); United States v. Jordon, 7 C.M.A.
452, 22 C.M.R. 242 (1957) (order to urinate was
illegal because it was an attempt to obtain a specimen by force). Cf. United States v. Williamson, 4
C.M.A. 320, 15 C.M.R. 320 (1954) (catherization to
obtain urine sample not violative of due process,
fourth amendment, or self-incrimination because of
passive nature of taking; unconscious suspect was
not required to actively participate).
• See e.g., United States v. Whipple, 4 M.J. 773
(C.G.C.M.R. 1978) (handing over drugs was "statement").
'See e.g., United States v. Woods, 3 M.J. 645
(N.C.M.R. 1977), pet. denied, 3 M.J. 264 (C.M.A.
1977) (Suspect swallowed packet of heroin. He was
placed in holding cell where eight days later nature
took its course and the evidence was recovered).
7

8

The question of admissibility of such would turn on
the same arguments relied upon for litigating the
voluntariness of a verbal utterance.
This route was implicity suggested in Ruiz, supra,
note 4. The Court noted that the Government's interest in controlling the drug problem could be protected by "assuring [the suspect's] voluntary cooperation or separating him from the service without
penalty." Retaining the individual and placing him
in a drug rehabilitation program would not constitute
a criminal consequence.

'Rule 305, Mil. R. Evid. discusses the rights warnings
requirements.
10

Article 31(b), U.C.M.J.

11

See notes 4, 8, su.pra.

12

See e.g., In re Melvin, 550 F.2d 674 (1st Cir. 1977)
(suspect may be compelled to stand in lineup). See
also United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. den. 419 U.S. 1010 (1974) (swabbing
hands to determine presence of explosives not violative of fifth or fourth amendment); United States v.
Holland, 378 F. Supp. 144 (D.C. Pa. 1974) (examination of suspect's mouth to see if tooth was missing
not violative of fifth or fourth amendment); United
States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968)
(No search when suspect's hands examined for tracer
powder); United States v. D'Amico, 408 F.2d 331
(2d Cir. 1969) (clipping hair from suspect's body).
In these situations the "intrusion" is slight.

13

See People v. Scott, 23 CrL 2251 (June 21, 1978)
(balancing test used to measure reasonableness of
body intrusion-massaging the prostrate gland to
obtain a semen sample). See note 48 infra.

u

Paragraph 152 of the Manual currently provides:
" . . . [B]ut a search which involves an intrusion
into [a person's] body, as by taking a sample of his
blood for chemical analysis, may be conducted
under this rule only where there is a clear indication that evidence of crime will be found, there is
reason to believe that delay will threaten the destruction of the evidence, and the method of conducting the search is reasonable."

, Rule 312(b) (1). The examination may be made subject to the inspection in accordance with Rule 314(e).
16

Rule 313, Mil. R. Evid. 313.

17

Rules 314(b) (border searches), 314(c) (searches
upon entry to United States installations, aircraft,
and vessels abroad).

18

Mil. R. Evid. 314(h) (searches within jails, confinement facilities, or similar facilities).

'"Mil. R. Evid. 314(g) (searches incident to lawful
apprehension).
20

Mil. R. Evid. 314(i) (emergency searches to save life
or for related purposes).

21

Mil. R. Evid. 315 (probable cause searches).

22

See e.g., United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d
991 (5th Cir. 1977) (visual examination of suspect's
vagina by customs inspectress netted 105 grams of
cocaine); Committee for G.I. Rights v. Callaway, 518
F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (visual rectal inspections
conducted on service members).

""See e.g., United States v. Holtz, 479 F.2d 89 (9th
Cir. 1973). See Rule 314(c).
"'Bell v. Wolfish, ___ U.S. ___ 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
Prisoners, after contact visits, were subject to strip
searches. They were required to spread their buttocks
for visual inspections. Males were required to lift
their genitals and vaginal cavities of female inmates
were also examined. The Supreme Court balanced
the interests involved and found the procedure to be
reasonable. Justice Marshall dissented noting that the
searches represented one of the most grevious offenses against personal dignity and common decency.
25

See notes 16-21, supra, and accompanying text. For
example, the MP's apprehending a suspect notice
him attempting to swallow suspected contraband or
evidence. They may immediately, but reasonably,
force him to open his mouth and may then extract
the object. If the MP's tell the suspect to take it out
himself and give it to them, is there an Article 31
problem? Possibly. If the individual is a suspect and
the MP's simply state, without effecting a lawful
apprehension, "give us the drugs you've got in your
mouth," there is a problem. That would amount to an
"interrogation". The military courts have generally
applied the Article 31 protections to situations where
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\

a lawful search or seizure was not effected first and
the suspect was simply told, or requested, to hand
over the contraband. See e.g., United States v.
Kinane, 1 M.J. 309, 311, n. 1 (C.M.A. 1976); United
States v. Hay, 3 M.J. 654 (A.C.M.R. 1977).

39

See United States v. Woods, 3 M.J. 645 (N.C.M.R.
1977), pet. denied 3 M.J. 264 (C.M.A. 1977) where
officials placed accused in holding cell, pursuant to
apprehension, for eight days. Nature ran its couTse
and packet of heroin, which accused had swallowed
upon appTehension, was recovered. The court cited a
case involving similaT facts, Venner v. State, 30 Md.
App. 599, 354 A.2d 483 (1976), aff'd, 279 Md. 47,
367 A.2d 949 (1977), in rejecting arguments that a
self-incrimination right was violated or that a bodily
intrusion had occurred. Rather, it was abandoned
property-the accused had shown no interest in retaining possession of either his stool oT its contents.
A different result would occur under Rule 312, and
possibly under due process standards, if the officials
had compelled the expulsion of the contraband without basing their actions on valid fourth amendment
principles. See eg., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952) (compelled vomiting to recover drugs).
See also United States v. McClung, 11 C.M.A. 754, 29
C.M.R. 570 (1960) (urine sample was involuntarily
obtained after forcing suspect to drink 8 to 10 glasses
of water).

0

See generally, Smith, Search and Seizure: Compelled
Surgical Intrusions? 27 Baylor L. Rev. 305 (1975).

41

543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977). This case is discussed at Minton,
Criminal Procedure-Surgical Removal of Evidence,
43 Mo. L. Rev. 133 (1978).

42

Mil. R. Evid. 312(f). See United States v. Miller, 15
C.M.A. 320, 35 C.M.R. 292 (1965) where court allowed evidence of alcohol content in blood taken from
unconscious suspect for purely diagnostic purposes.
Absent was any "nexus" between the doctor and enforcement agents or the suspect's superiors who may
have been interested in the results.

43

This is particularly true where the "diagnostic"
sample is being taken from a "suspect" at the request
of law enforcement officers. If a random sampling
program is underway and the individual is not a
suspect, then fewer problems exist. If during the
testing, an individual indicates that the test will turn
out positive, he becomes a suspect and the Ruiz
problem looms.

"" Compare with nonconsensual intrusions in Rule 312
(c) (1) and (2). See notes 27-33 infra, and accompanying text.
zr

Mil. R. Evid. 312(c) (1).

"Mil. R. Evid. 312(c) (2).
29

The rule unfortunately does not define "appropriate
medical qualifications" but rather leaves that task to
the Secretaries of the various services. In the absence
of such direction, common sense should control: The
more sensitive or delicate the intrusion, the more
medical training the individual should possess.

w

When seeking authorization under Rule 315, the authorities must be aware of existing case law which
requires independent and neutral "magistrates"
(United States v. Ezell, 6 M.J. 307 (C.M.A. 1979)
and an oath or affirmation (United States v. Fimmano, 8 M.J. 197 (C.M.A. 1980) ).

31

32

See note 29, supra.

'

!d.

"" This provision apparently follows the prevailing position that the Government's interests in the security
of confinement facilities carries special weight and
consideration. See genera,lly, Bell v. Wolfish, ___ U.S.
___ , ___ U.S. ___ , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), discussed
at note 24, supra. See also Mil. R. Evid. 314(h).
" The standard to be applied for a consensual "seizuTe"
of bodily fluids should follow the standard to be
used for any consent search.
""Note that this language tracts with the language in
the 1969 Manual provision at paragraph 152. See
note 14 supra.
36

See notes 4-8 supra, and accompanying text.

37

Compelling bodily elimination clearly Taises selfincrimination problems. See United States v. McClung, 11 C.M.A. 754, 29 C.M.R. 570 (suspect's urine
obtained after forcing 8 to 10 glasses of water into
his system). If however, the authorities proceed under fourth amendment (Rule 312) procedures, arguably they can force the individual to expel the sought
evidence as long as due process standards are met.
See notes 47, 48 infra, and accompanying text.

"Key here would be an analysis of the facts to determine if the evidence was obtained by a lawful search
or seizure or by an "interrogation." See note 25
supra.

"See e.g., 312(b) (2) (involuntaTy visual inspection of
body, including body cavities, pursuant to probable
cause search); Rule 312(c) (2) (nonconsensual search
of rectum based upon probable cause).
•• The visual, nonconsensual, inspection of the body
would of have to based upon one of the stated procedures in Rule 312(b). See notes 16-21, supra and
accompanying text.
"For example, even as the CID agent is speaking,
medical personnel concerned over the medical wellbeing of the suspects may be taking blood samples
and giving them valid medical examinations.
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"Rochin v, California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
"For example, in People v. Scott, 23 CrL 2253 (June
21, 1978) the California Supreme court balanced the
interests of the Government and the suspect and considered the general nature of the intrusion. It concluded that a court-ordered bodily intrusion, which
consisted of the suspect's prostrate gland being mas-

saged in order to obtain a semen sample, was as
extreme as the regurgitation in Rochin. But in Darland v. State, 25 CrL. 2377 (Aug 1, 1979) the court
found no due process violation where a police officer
obtained a urine sample from a DWI suspect by
holding a styrofoam cup in front of him while he was
urinating.

Eyewitness Identification Under The Military Rules of Evidence
CPT(P) Richard H. Gasperini
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The issue of eyewitness identification has
always included two components: right to counsel and due process. Prior to adoption of the
Military Rules of Evidence1 the military practitioner had no single source of authority pertaining to these two diverse concepts; this void
has now been filled by rule 321. 2 Additionally,
the rule sets out significant procedural changes
with regard to the admission of identification
evidence.
Introduction of Eyewitness Testimony
Under the hearsay definition encompassed in
former Manual Paragraph 139a, in-court reference to extrajudicial declarations of identity
were considered to be hearsay and therefore
generally inadmissible. 3 To qualify for admission such out-of-court identifications had to fall
under either a recognized hearsay exception•
or come within the special bolstering provisions
of Paragraph 153a, MCM. That paragraph
permitted the admission of such evidence for
the limited purpose of corroborating courtroom
testimony, provided the witness first made an
in-court identification of the accused. 5
Under the Military Rules of Evidence testimony concerning an out-of-court identification
remains, as a general rule, hearsay. 6 Admission
of such evidence must therefore be based on a
recognized hearsay exception listed in rules
803 7 or 804 8 or some other evidentiary provision.
The Military rules have in rule 801(d) (1)
(C)9 adopted a provision which significantly

expands the opportunity to introduce eyewitness testimony. 10 It provides that a statement of
identification, whether given in court or out of
court, is not hearsay when the identifying witness is present in curt and subject to crossexamination.11 Under this rule an eyewitness
may refer to an extrajudicial identification
even though that identification does not qualify
as a traditional hearsay exception and notwithstanding the fact that an in-court identification
is not first made.
The second sentence of rule 321 12 is the vehicle
for introducing most evidence admissible under
rule 801. It provides that a person making an
out-of-court identification, as well as anyone
observing it, may testify concerning that matter. This provision is applicable to those situations where a victim, or any eyewitness, identifies a criminal shortly after an incident but
cannot later testify at trial that the accused is
the previously identified criminal. Under such
circumstances it is incumbent upon the prosecution to call as a witness a third party observer
to the original identification to testify that the
person identified by the victim at the former
proceeding is in fact the accused. The second
sentence of rule 321 13 allows for the introduction of such testimony, but contrary positions
can be taken as to how this provision should be
interpreted. One view is that linkage between
a pretrial identification and the accused can be
established by simply presenting the testimony
of a third party observer to the pre-trial identification. The clear language of the rule and
abundant judicial authority supports this posi-

